Today's post comes from a response that I recently sent to a couple of my Soldiers who participated in some of the operations referenced below. They requested a brief account of our last few months in Afghanistan and, after finalizing the editing process, I felt the summary would also make a suitable basis for a posting on the tenth anniversary of the attack that caused us to deploy there in the first place.
As other peers and colleagues post remembrances and tributes today, I don't feel like mine is particularly special or unique; but, I do believe it offers a little something extra to their contributions and other outlets you may have already perused. To my new Moroccan friends and current colleagues, I share this brief account as a different perspective from those that you may be familiar as well as to continue to introduce myself. And, to SSG Vile, SGT Pirtle and SPC King, I hope it contributes to their remembrance in some small way.
To accomplish this security mission, the troop established a company-level combat outpost (COP), conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, and supported the Afghan Army observation post (OP) that overlooked Nishigam and two valleys that converged there. On May 1st, a large AAF force overran the small OP, and we subsequently altered our operations. After the ensuing brigade-level operation to stabilize the area and secure Afghan prisoners of war concluded, the troop shifted manpower and resources to rebuild and secure the OP until its redeployment a month later.
Members of Blue Platoon patrolling in the mountains north or Nishigam. The terrain was pure mountains, with one range north of the Kunar River and another south of it. Three main valleys converged into the river and acted as active routes for AAF.
At the time, C/6-4 CAV consisted of two maneuver platoons (White and Blue) and a headquarters platoon (our third maneuver platoon, Red, was split from us and operating to our north). Prior to the shift towards a more static footprint on May 1st, each of the maneuver platoons conducted at least seven multi-day security operations that typically lasted between 72 and 120 hours.
While "outside of the wire," the platoons typically set up ambushes, conducted search operations, engaged locals, checked on contracting projects, defended the local government center or trained Afghan security forces in an attempt to improve each of the factors leading to a more stable region. During these patrols, each platoon was typically engaged by ineffective long-range AAF direct or indirect fire that typically left all involved uninjured and any equipment without a scratch.
Soldiers set up an indirect fire system during an occupation mission. Though mostly uninhabited, more than 30,000 people still called the region home. Unfortunately, most of them lived in small villages away from the central river, limiting our interaction as well as our ability to directly support them with projects and community services.
On May 1st, about a week after we began establishing our COP in a key location along the only road in the region, a four-day fight broke out when approximately 100 AAF fighters surrounded and overran OP Bari Alai, the Afghan Army OP overlooking Nishigam. During the raid, AAF killed three American and a handful of Latvian and Afghan Soldiers and captured another 11 Afghan Soldiers. At the time of the attack, White platoon was conducting security operations at the new COP, leaving Blue platoon to respond and maneuver by vehicle and foot to the village while a quick reaction force led by our squadron commander moved by helicopter to the site.
For the next 18 hours, members from the troop headquarters and Blue platoon - augmented by another unit - pursued AAF fighters while White platoon secured the COP and its supporting OP. After the maneuver, White and Blue platoon switched responsibilities, with White platoon moving to OP Bari Alai, where it rebuilt and defended the small outpost for the next month and a half.
Blue platoon moved to the COP and assumed primary responsibility for its security. But their reprieve from fighting was brief and on May 3rd, a force estimated at fifty AAF fighters attempted to raid the their OP in a similar manner to OP Bari Alai. Defeated after an hour of hand grenades, direct fire, mortar and artillery, the enemy retreated but spent the next few days unsuccessfully attempting to retrieve their dead and wounded in what became the last significant fight of our deployment.
Some of the members of Blue Platoon after more than three days of pursuing AAF down the mountain and defending the COP OP in "less-than-ideal" conditions.
After this action, both platoons primarily conducted static security operations at their respective positions, Blue at the COP and White at the OP. During the final month, each platoon came under sporadic AAF direct and indirect fire attacks while attempting to establish, fortify and secure their positions.
In total, the three-month period between April and June marked an active time for C/6-4 CAV. The troop conducted over 20 security operations, excluding the COP establishment COP and the OP rebuilding and engaged in direct or indirect fire with AAF more than thirty times in its attempt to secure and stabilize the area. During the conflict, each side sustained losses.
Fortunately, outside of the AAF raid on Bari Alai, the human toll to Coalition Forces (CF) only involved one minor wound sustained during an RPG attack; however, losses in equipment and confidence of the local population had a much more dramatic effect on unit morale and mission effectiveness. Effects on the AAF were also mixed.
Though we estimated over a hundred AAF were taken out of the fight during this period, the success of their attack on OP Bari Alai as well as their ability to continue harassing attacks after the brigade operation displayed to the Ghaziabad population that they had the potential ability to outlast CF initiatives within the region. This result most likely offset any lasting positive effects of the AAF's diminished numbers. Further, I have a feeling that new recruits replaced old fighters, and the population was less likely to believe in or support our security mission. But, these weren't "deal-breakers," only negative factors to work through.
White platoon testing one of the first TOW-enabled MRAPs in the region.
Through it all, our security operations varied but were continuous. Between the months of April and June, the troop worked hard, escalating the tempo of operations while most other units either sustained or drew theirs down. Each member of the troop engaged in AAF direct or indirect fire engagements that either concluded after a couple of shots or, in one instance, a few days. Despite these engagements, the unit improved the district’s infrastructure and communal governing body while preparing for a change of authority with the incoming unit and subsequent redeployment.
I've never been more proud to be a part of a group of men. For all their hard work, courage and sacrifice, I offer my thanks today and everyday. Keep up the good work; America wouldn't be here without it.
This post was written from the viewpoint of the troop commander and reflect his perspective two years after C/6-4 CAV redeployed. I produced my facts and statistics from saved records and reports that were written during or near the time of the deployment. If you have any questions, comments, additions or clarifications, please direct them to jay.bessey@gmail.com. To my former Soldiers, I'd love to hear your perspective, so please send it!
This post was written from the viewpoint of the troop commander and reflect his perspective two years after C/6-4 CAV redeployed. I produced my facts and statistics from saved records and reports that were written during or near the time of the deployment. If you have any questions, comments, additions or clarifications, please direct them to jay.bessey@gmail.com. To my former Soldiers, I'd love to hear your perspective, so please send it!
