Today in my World Issues Seminar, we had a decent discussion revolving around Tunisia and how events triggered by last December's "Jasmine Revolution" may unfold in the near future. Two questions dominated the discussion, with the first centering on the assumption that the Tunisian movement was the 'most promising' of the Middle Eastern movements to transition to a democracy: (1) What makes it the 'most promising' in democratic terms, and (2) What 'clouds' hang over the Tunisian 'revolution'? (or, what factors have the potential for holding back transition to democracy in Tunisia?).
Our answers to the first question varied but focused on four promising factors that may lead to democracy in Tunisia's near future: (1) Tunisia's long history of political activism and social mobilization, (2) Its economy (not being tied to oil) and (3) the minimal role that the Tunisian Army has traditionally played in its government, and (4) Tunisia's above-average education system (relative to MENA countries).
In answering the second question, we came up with four potential factors that may limit Tunisia's transition to democracy. (1) Its economy (having slumped over the past year), (2) the effect of the global economic crisis on European markets, (3) a lack of lasting unity within the movement and (4) remnants of the former regime's corruption.
With arguably the first internationally-relevant post-'revolution' moment coming later this month (the national election set for 23 October), we may have an indication of which way the mid and long-range winds will blow. The optimist in me hopes that the reactivated political groups and unions establish the promising framework alluded to within the International Crisis Group's report attached below; however, my pessimistic side warns that the lack of a unified goal may prolong - or even sabotage - any potential evolution to a democratic system.
To see a few sources that we referenced and form your own opinions, you can find the International Crisis Group's report on Tunisia here, a lecture on Tunisia by Professor Juan Cole (University of Michigan) here, and some controversies concerning the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution here (French).
Our answers to the first question varied but focused on four promising factors that may lead to democracy in Tunisia's near future: (1) Tunisia's long history of political activism and social mobilization, (2) Its economy (not being tied to oil) and (3) the minimal role that the Tunisian Army has traditionally played in its government, and (4) Tunisia's above-average education system (relative to MENA countries).
In answering the second question, we came up with four potential factors that may limit Tunisia's transition to democracy. (1) Its economy (having slumped over the past year), (2) the effect of the global economic crisis on European markets, (3) a lack of lasting unity within the movement and (4) remnants of the former regime's corruption.
With arguably the first internationally-relevant post-'revolution' moment coming later this month (the national election set for 23 October), we may have an indication of which way the mid and long-range winds will blow. The optimist in me hopes that the reactivated political groups and unions establish the promising framework alluded to within the International Crisis Group's report attached below; however, my pessimistic side warns that the lack of a unified goal may prolong - or even sabotage - any potential evolution to a democratic system.
To see a few sources that we referenced and form your own opinions, you can find the International Crisis Group's report on Tunisia here, a lecture on Tunisia by Professor Juan Cole (University of Michigan) here, and some controversies concerning the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution here (French).
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